This article has evidence gaps. Read the research notes before relying on its conclusions.
Research cutoff: · Updated:A network of ports and inland connections
Maritime transport is broader than the movement of ships. For Iran, the subject includes the institutions responsible for ports, the terminals handling cargo, and the inland connections that allow goods to reach their destinations. The International Association of Ports and Harbors lists Bandar Abbas, Imam Khomeini, Bushehr, Chabahar, Anzali, Noshahr, and Amirabad among ports associated with Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, usually abbreviated PMO. Its institutional description identifies maritime commerce, coastal communications, and port-related charges among PMO’s responsibilities. s1
This list establishes the breadth of the network, but it is not a ranking of port performance. Nor does inclusion under a national organization mean that every terminal has an identical operating arrangement. The documented Chabahar agreement illustrates why it is useful to distinguish a port authority from the company contracted to equip and operate a particular terminal. s1s2
[s1] [s2]Chabahar: geography, contracts, and corridor ambitions
Chabahar faces the Sea of Oman in southeastern Iran, outside the Strait of Hormuz. A field-based study by the Middle East Institute of Japan explains its significance as an alternative maritime gateway and as part of efforts to connect Iran with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and wider regional markets. The same study describes the International North-South Transport Corridor as a multimodal route linking India and Russia through Iran, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea. These are overlapping connectivity ambitions rather than proof of a single seamless transport service. s3
On 13 May 2024, India Ports Global Limited and Iran’s PMO signed a long-term contract concerning the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar. India’s official announcement identifies the parties and the terminal. A subsequent parliamentary statement describes a ten-year arrangement to equip and operate its general cargo and container terminal. These records support a specific contractual development; they do not establish completion of every proposed port or inland transport investment. s2s4
That distinction is important for rail connectivity. The Japanese institute’s study reported that the Chabahar–Zahedan railway remained incomplete in late February 2024. This is a dated observation, not a statement of its October 2026 condition. It demonstrates why a map of intended corridors needs to distinguish existing transport links from infrastructure still being developed at the time of observation. s3
[s2] [s3] [s4]What the available cargo figures establish
An Indian parliamentary answer published in March 2025 reports cargo volumes for Shahid Beheshti at Chabahar. The four completed fiscal-year entries retained below show higher reported volume in FY 2023–24 than in FY 2020–21, with a small decline between FY 2021–22 and FY 2022–23. These figures concern the named facility in that answer. They are not Iran’s national maritime trade, a measure of all Chabahar terminals, or a container-only series. s5
The answer also lists FY 2024–25, but it was issued before that Indian financial year ended. The cargo table does not specify the final observation date. That entry is therefore excluded from the comparable completed-year series. The source does not explain its cargo-counting methodology sufficiently to determine whether categories such as transshipment or empty equipment are included. These limits matter before comparing its figures with other port publications. s5
[s5]Shahid Beheshti facility at Chabahar, Iran, as named in the Indian parliamentary answer · fiscal
Data, units and methodology
Transcribed from Annexure 2 of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question 4624, answered 28 March 2025. Indian financial years run from 1 April to 31 March and are indexed here by their starting year. The source labels volume as MT, interpreted as metric tonnes. It does not provide detailed counting or revision rules. Only completed financial years preceding the answer are included. The FY 2024–25 entry is excluded because the answer predates year-end and does not identify that cargo observation's cutoff.
| Reporting period | Reported total cargo volume (metric tonnes) |
|---|---|
| FY 2020-21 | 1,224,345 observed — Reported value; the source does not explicitly identify a revision or estimation status.[s5] |
| FY 2021-22 | 2,228,820 observed — Reported value; the source does not explicitly identify a revision or estimation status.[s5] |
| FY 2022-23 | 2,220,038 observed — Reported value; the source does not explicitly identify a revision or estimation status.[s5] |
| FY 2023-24 | 2,840,369 observed — Reported value; the source does not explicitly identify a revision or estimation status.[s5] |
Four comparable completed financial years were available in this inspected source, fewer than the preferred five.
The table's precise terminal coverage and cargo-counting rules are not defined.
The series is not national port throughput or total maritime trade.
No observations for earlier years or later completed financial years were verified.
Assessing development without confusing plans and results
A sound reading of Iran’s maritime development separates institutional responsibilities, terminal contracts, physical connections, and measured cargo movements. A contract records an agreed operating framework. A cargo observation records activity within a defined reporting period. A corridor study explains strategic possibilities and constraints. None alone establishes the cost, reliability, or present availability of a complete shipping route. s1s2s3s5
The evidence assembled here offers a historical introduction and a limited facility-level trend. A current national overview still requires comparable statistics for the other major ports, verified shipping services, and updated evidence about inland connections and operational disruptions. The individual port pages provide the appropriate structure for that further research, while container shipping requires separate measures from cargo tonnage.
[s1] [s2] [s3] [s5]Sources & research notes
- [s1] Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO)International Association of Ports and Harbors · Entry marked Last Update: 08.Jan.2026; institutional description and Overview port list · Accessed 2026-10-28
- [s2] Long-term Main Contract for development of Shahid Beheshti Port Terminal, Chabahar signed between India Port Global Limited (IPGL) and Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO) of IranGovernment of India, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways · Release ID 2020454; contract signing and parties · Accessed 2026-10-28
- [s3] Diversification of Iran’s Diplomacy and its Connectivity Strategies: Focusing on Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)Middle East Institute of Japan · Chabahar Port and Iran’s connectivity strategy; Regional connections between Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor · Accessed 2026-10-28
- [s4] Development of Chabahar PortGovernment of India, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways · Opening paragraph describing the ten-year general cargo and container terminal contract · Accessed 2026-10-28
- [s5] Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4624: Overseas Ports of IndiaGovernment of India, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways · PDF page 1, answer; PDF page 3, Annexure 2, Shahid Beheshti cargo volume table · Accessed 2026-10-28
limitations
- The numerical evidence covers one named facility and cannot represent the entire maritime sector.
- The connectivity study's railway observation is explicitly historical.
- The 2024 contract announcements establish the agreement, not uninterrupted operation through the editorial cutoff.
- Sources were accessed after the cutoff; the page does not establish current operating conditions.
unverified items
- Operational conditions and disruptions affecting Iranian maritime transport through 2026-10-26.
- Current shipping services, terminal availability, and relevant sanctions arrangements.
- Completion and operating status of proposed inland rail connections.
- Comparable current accounts of Bandar Abbas, Imam Khomeini, Bushehr, and the northern ports.
data gaps
- A comparable national annual series covering the target 2012–2026 window was not verified.
- The latest inspected Chabahar cargo table includes an ambiguous partial FY 2024–25 observation, which was excluded.
- No verified annual series for container traffic, port dwell time, maritime employment, or shipping connectivity was included.
- Terminal-level counting methodology requires clarification before comparison with other datasets.
coverage period
Historical corridor context through early 2024, 2024 terminal agreements, and completed Indian financial-year cargo observations from FY 2020–21 to FY 2023–24.