Electoral System

Iran’s elections should be understood as several distinct contests. The presidency heads the executive except in matters assigned directly to the leadership. Parliament, commonly called the Majles, is the national legislature. The Assembly of Experts has a different function: it selects and constitutionally oversees the Supreme Leader. Elections to these bodies do not confer identical powers. s1s2

The House of Commons Library’s account of the March 2024 elections describes a parliament elected for four-year terms and an Assembly of Experts elected for eight-year terms. Both were elected that March, but their different functions make their results separate political questions. Local councils form another branch of the electoral landscape; their role should be examined through the specific council framework rather than inferred from national election rules. s2s1

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The Constitution provides for direct presidential election to a four-year term, with only one immediately consecutive reelection. A candidate must obtain an absolute majority of votes cast. If nobody does, Article 117 provides for a second round between the leading candidates, subject to its withdrawal provisions. Article 115 sets qualifications including nationality, administrative ability, and adherence to the Islamic Republic and its official religious school. s1

These rules describe selection for an office whose authority has constitutional boundaries. Winning the presidency does not transfer the powers assigned to the Supreme Leader or remove the other institutions that supervise and constrain elected government. s1s3

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Article 99 assigns the Guardian Council supervision of presidential, parliamentary, and Assembly of Experts elections, as well as referendums. Its composition combines Islamic-law specialists selected by the Supreme Leader with jurists elected by parliament from nominees of the judiciary’s head. s1

Election administration involves a separate apparatus. The parliamentary electoral-law translation inspected at Syracuse University assigns implementation roles to the Interior Ministry and provincial, county, and district authorities. It also describes executive and supervisory boards. This establishes an important institutional distinction: organizing polling and exercising supervisory authority are separate responsibilities. The translation is useful for understanding that architecture, but its detailed thresholds and procedures should not be treated as a consolidated statement of law effective in 2026. s4

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Freedom House’s report covering 2024 assesses Iran’s elections as failing international democratic standards. It identifies Guardian Council screening as a central restriction: voters choose among candidates admitted to the contest, while political actors outside the establishment face substantial barriers. This is an independent assessment of electoral practice, distinct from the Constitution’s description of institutions. s3

The March 2024 parliamentary and Assembly of Experts contests illustrate the difference. The Commons Library records the exclusion of reformist and moderate candidates, including former president Hassan Rouhani from the Assembly contest. It also reports the Guardian Council’s explanation that most rejected Assembly candidates failed education-related criteria. Reporting both the institutional explanation and the observed narrowing of competition helps readers distinguish stated grounds from their political consequences. s2

The presidential election later in 2024 followed Ebrahim Raisi’s death and proceeded to a runoff in which Masoud Pezeshkian defeated Saeed Jalili. Freedom House records both that electoral outcome and substantial restrictions on the candidate field. Competition among approved candidates and restrictions on entry can therefore coexist. s3

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Freedom House describes low turnout in the 2024 national contests and connects it with public disillusionment. Such interpretation should remain attributed: an aggregate turnout figure cannot identify every abstaining voter’s motivation. Parliamentary elections and presidential rounds also represent different events, so their participation figures should retain their election type and round rather than be combined into a single annual observation. s3

The linked pages separate presidential elections, parliamentary elections, local councils, electoral law, participation, and administration. Together, these questions provide a more useful reading of an election than the winner’s name alone: which office was contested, who could stand, who ran the process, and what evidence supports judgments about participation and fairness?

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