Air Navigation Services

Airports and the services coordinating aircraft movements are closely connected in Iran’s institutional structure. The Airports Council International directory assigns air-navigation and air-traffic-management responsibilities to Iran Airports & Air Navigation Company alongside airport management and development. That description identifies a provider’s remit; it does not independently establish service quality, equipment availability or safety performance. s1

The distinction is essential when reading technical announcements. Evidence that a system exists addresses a different question from evidence that it is operating throughout a network, meeting reliability targets or reducing incidents. This page therefore separates reported technical development from independently demonstrated outcomes.

ICAO’s Middle East Air Navigation Report 2024 includes an Iranian contribution describing an Electronic Flight Strip System. A flight strip is a record used in the controller’s workflow; the contribution explains a move from paper recording toward digital storage and processing. It attributes development to specialists within Iran Airports & Air Navigation Company. s2

The contribution describes receiving and sending messages through the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network, abbreviated AFTN, and integration with Iran’s electronic flight-plan system and the locally developed Zagros surveillance system. It also describes functions intended to reduce verbal coordination between controller units. These are reported design and implementation features. The report does not, in this section, provide an independently audited nationwide deployment inventory or quantified operational benefits. ICAO’s disclaimer explicitly identifies the report’s reliance on third-party information. s2

Reported electronic flight-strip interfaces

The diagram summarizes interfaces described in Iran’s contribution to the 2024 regional report. Integration lines indicate data relationships, not institutional authority; the diagram does not establish deployment at every airport.

An operational information system cannot by itself establish that an airspace is suitable for civil flights. EASA, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, issued a separate assessment covering the Tehran Flight Information Region, identified by the code OIIX. Its Iran bulletin, revised on 30 September 2026, recommended that operators within its stated scope avoid that airspace at all altitudes and flight levels. The bulletin described risks associated with military activity and possible misidentification. s3

This recommendation is an attributed regulatory risk assessment, not evidence that every Iranian airport was closed. Its applicability includes EASA operators and specified third-country operations under EASA authorization. Understanding the distinction prevents a technical modernization report from being mistaken for a current operating clearance, or an external warning from being mistaken for a universal closure order. s3